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Abstract
We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems which obtain
tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our settings, buyers arrive online and
purchase bundles of items; buyers’ values for the bundles are drawn from known distributions.
This problem is closely related to the so-called prophet-inequality of Krengel and Sucheston
[22] and its extensions in recent literature. Motivated by applications to cloud economics, we
consider two kinds of buyer preferences. In the first, items correspond to different units of
time at which a resource is available; the items are arranged in a total order and buyers desire
intervals of items. The second corresponds to bandwidth allocation over a tree network; the
items are edges in the network and buyers desire paths.
Because buyers’ preferences have complementarities in the settings we consider, recent
constant-factor approximations via item prices do not apply, and indeed strong negative re-
sults are known. We develop static, anonymous bundle pricing mechanisms.
For the interval preferences setting, we show that static, anonymous bundle pricings achieve a
sublogarithmic competitive ratio, which is optimal (within constant factors) over the class of all
online allocation algorithms, truthful or not. For the path preferences setting, we obtain a nearly-
tight logarithmic competitive ratio. Both of these results exhibit an exponential improvement
over item pricings for these settings. Our results extend to settings where the seller has multiple
copies of each item, with the competitive ratio decreasing linearly with supply. Such a gradual
tradeoff between supply and the competitive ratio for welfare was previously known only for the
single item prophet inequality.
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1 Introduction
Consider an online resource allocation setting in which a seller offers multiple items for sale and
buyers with preferences over bundles of items arrive over time. We desire an incentive-compatible
mechanism for allocating items to buyers that maximizes social welfare—the total value obtained
by all the buyers from the allocation. In the offline setting, this is easily achieved by the VCG mech-
anism. In the online context, however, we would like the mechanism to allocate items and charge
payments as buyers arrive, without waiting for future arrivals. What would such a mechanism look
like, and can it obtain close to the optimal social welfare?
We consider two settings for online resource allocation motivated by applications in cloud eco-
nomics. In the interval preferences setting, a cloud provider has multiple copies of a single resource
available to allocate over time. Customers have jobs that require renting the resource for some
amount of time. If we think of each time unit as a different item, customers desire intervals of
items. Different intervals, corresponding to scheduling a job at different times or renting the re-
source for different lengths of time, may bring different values to the customer. This model closely
follows the framework described in [4]. Our second setting, the path preferences setting, models
bandwidth allocation over a communication network. Each customer is a source-sink pair in the
network that wishes to communicate, and assigns values to paths in the network between the source
and the sink. The items are the edges in the network. We focus on the special case where the
network is a tree.1 See [19] for further motivation behind this setting.
It is easy to observe that because of the online nature of the problem no algorithm for online
resource allocation, truthful or otherwise, can obtain optimal social welfare: the competitive ratio
is at least 2 even when there is only a single item for sale and the seller knows both the order of
arrival of buyers as well as their value distributions.2 In a remarkable result, Feldman et al. [15]
showed that this gap of 2 is the worst possible over a large class of buyer preferences: a particularly
simple and natural incentive-compatible mechanism, namely posted item pricing, achieves a
2-approximation to the optimal social welfare in those settings.
Posted pricing is perhaps the most ubiquitous real-world mechanism for allocating goods to
consumers. Supermarkets are a familiar example: the store determines prices for items, which may
be sold individually or packaged into bundles. Customers arrive in arbitrary order and purchase
the items they most desire at the advertised prices, unless they’re sold out. Many other domains
have a similar sequential posted pricing format, from airfares to online retail to concert tickets.
Feldman et al.’s results apply to settings where buyers’ values over bundles of items are fractionally
subadditive, a.k.a. XOS. In these settings, the seller determines a price for each item based on his
knowledge of the buyers’ value distributions. These prices are anonymous and static, meaning that
the same prices are offered to each customer and remain unchanged until supply runs out.
However, the settings we consider exhibit complementarity in buyers’ values: buyers may require
certain minimal bundles of items to satisfy their requirements; anything less brings them zero
value. For these settings, Feldman et al. [15] show that anonymous item pricings cannot achieve
a competitive ratio better than linear in the degree of complementarity (that is, the size of the
1Observe that the interval preferences setting is a special case of the path preferences setting.
2Suppose there is one item and two buyers. The buyer that arrives first has value 1 for the item; the second buyer
has value 1/ε with probability ε, and 0 otherwise, for some small ε > 0. The optimal allocation is to give the item
to the first buyer if the second buyer has zero value for it, and otherwise give it to the second buyer. This achieves
social welfare of 2− ε in expectation over the buyers’ values. However, any online algorithm produces an allocation
with expected welfare at most 1.
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minimal desired bundle of items). See Footnote 3 for an example. Is a better competitive ratio
possible? Can it be achieved through a truthful mechanism as simple as static, anonymous item
pricings?
We show that near-optimal competitive ratios can be achieved for the interval
and path preferences settings via a static, anonymous bundle pricing mechanism.
Our mechanism is a posted bundle pricing: the seller partitions items into bundles, and
prices each bundle based on his knowledge of the distribution of buyers’ preferences. Customers
arrive in arbitrary order and purchase the bundles they most desire at the advertised prices, unless
they’re sold out. As in Feldman et al.’s work, our bundle pricings are static and anonymous.
We now elaborate on our results and techniques.
1.1 Our results
Recall that in the interval preferences setting, items are arranged in a total order and buyers desire
intervals of items. We assume that each buyer’s value function is drawn independently from some
arbitrary but known distribution over possible value vectors. The seller’s computational problem
is essentially a stochastic online interval packing. Let L denote the length of the longest interval
that may be desired by some buyer. Feldman et al. [15] show that no item pricing can achieve a
o(L) competitive ratio in this setting. Im and Wang [18] previously showed that in fact no online
algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of o
(
logL
log logL
)
. Our first main result matches this lower
bound to within constant factors.
Theorem 1.1. For the interval preferences setting, there exists a static, anonymous bundle pricing
with competitive ratio O
(
logL
log logL
)
for social welfare.
The interval preferences setting was studied recently by Chawla et al. [11], who also designed a
static item pricing mechanism for the problem. Chawla et al. showed that when the item supply is
large, specifically, when the seller has Ω˜(L6/ε3) copies of each item for some ε > 0, static anonymous
item pricings achieve a 1 − ε approximation to social welfare. Chawla et al.’s result suggests that
there is a tradeoff between item supply and the performance of posted pricings in this setting. Our
second main result maps out this tradeoff exactly (to within constant factors) for bundle pricing.
We show that the approximation factor decreases inversely with item supply, and is a constant
when supply is Ω(logL). In other words, to achieve a constant approximation via bundle pricing,
we require an exponentially smaller bound on the item supply relative to that required by Chawla
et al. for a 1− ε approximation. Furthermore, this tradeoff is tight to within constant factors.
Theorem 1.2. For the interval preferences setting, if every item has at least B > 0 copies available,
then a static, anonymous bundle pricing achieves a competitive ratio of
O
(
1
B
logL
log logL− logB
)
when B < logL, and O(1) otherwise.
Theorem 1.3. For the interval preferences setting, if every item has at least B > 0 copies available,
no online algorithm can obtain a competitive ratio of o
(
1
B
logL
log logL
)
for social welfare.
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We then turn to the path preferences setting, which appears to be considerably harder than the
special case of interval preferences. In this setting buyers are single-minded in that they desire a
particular path, although their value for this path is unknown to the seller. As before let L denote
the length of the longest bundle/path that any buyer desires. We first observe that no online
algorithm can achieve a subpolynomial in L competitive ratio for this setting (see Theorem 4.3).
We therefore explore competitive ratios as functions of H, the ratio of the maximum possible value
to the minimum possible non-zero value. In terms of H, the construction of Im and Wang [18]
provides a lower bound of Ω(logH/ log logH) on the competitive ratio of any online algorithm. We
nearly match this lower bound:
Theorem 1.4. For the path preferences setting, there exists a static, anonymous bundle pricing
with competitive ratio O (logH) for social welfare.
As for the interval preferences setting, we obtain a linear tradeoff between item supply and the
performance of bundle pricing for the path preferences setting.
Theorem 1.5. For the path preferences setting, if every edge has at least B > 0 copies available,
then a static, anonymous bundle pricing achieves a competitive ratio of O
(
1
B logH
)
for welfare.
Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 for the interval preferences setting are proved in Section 3. Section 4
presents the lower bounds—Theorems 1.3 and 4.3. Our main results for the path preferences
setting, Theorem 1.4 and Theorem 1.5, are proved in Section 5. Some of our results extend with
the same competitive ratios to settings with non-decreasing marginal production costs instead of
a fixed supply; this setting is discussed in Section 6. Any proofs skipped in the main body of the
paper can be found in Section 7.
All of our theorems are constructive but require an explicit description of the buyers’ value
distributions. The pricings guaranteed above can be constructed in time polynomial in the sum
over the buyers of the sizes of the supports of their value distributions.
1.2 Related work and our techniques
Competitive ratios for welfare in online settings are known as prophet inequalities following the
work of Krengel and Sucheston [22] and Samuel-Cahn [25] on the special case of allocating a single
item. Most arguments for prophet inequalities follow a standard approach, introduced by Kleinberg
and Weinberg [21] and further developed by Feldman et al. [15], of setting “balanced” prices or
thresholds for each buyer: informally, prices should be low enough that buyers can afford their
optimal allocations, and at the same time high enough so that allocating items non-optimally
recovers as revenue a good fraction of the optimal welfare that is “blocked” by that allocation.
Given such balanced prices, we can then account for the social welfare of the online allocation in
two components—the seller’s share of the welfare, namely his revenue, and the buyers’ share of
the welfare, namely their utility. On the one hand, the prices of any items/bundles sold by the
mechanism contribute to the seller’s revenue. On the other hand, any item/bundle that goes unsold
in the online allocation contributes to the buyers’ utility: the buyer who receives it in the optimal
allocation forgoes it in the online allocation for another one with even higher utility. The argument
asserts that in either case good social welfare is achieved.
When buyers have values with complements and an item pricing is used this argument breaks
down. In particular, it may be the case that a bundle allocated by the optimal solution goes unsold
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because only one of the items in the bundle is sold out. The loss of the buyer’s utility in this case
may not be adequately covered by the revenue generated by the sold subset of items.3 We therefore
consider pricing bundles of items.
Recently Duetting et al. [14] developed a framework for obtaining balanced prices via a sort
of extension theorem. They showed that if one can define prices achieving a somewhat stronger
balance condition in the full-information setting, where the seller knows the buyers’ value functions
exactly, then a good approximation through posted prices can be obtained in the Bayesian setting
as well. A significant benefit of using this approach is that it suffices to focus on the full-information
setting, and the designer need no longer worry about the value distribution.
In the full-information setting, even with arbitrary values over bundles of items, it is easy to
construct a static, anonymous bundle pricing that achieves a 2-approximation for welfare, as demon-
strated, for example, by Cohen-Addad et al. [12]. Unfortunately, these prices do not satisfy the
strong balance condition of Duetting et al. In fact we do not know of any distribution-independent
way of defining bundle prices in the full information setting that satisfy the balance condition of
Duetting et al. with approximation factors matching the ones we achieve. Furthermore, while a
main goal of our work is to establish a tradeoff between supply and competitive ratio for welfare,
the framework of Duetting et al. does not seem to lend itself to such a tradeoff.
The crux of our argument for both of our settings lies in constructing a distribution-dependent
partition of items into bundles, and pricing (subsets of) these bundles. For the interval preferences
setting we construct a partition for which there exists an allocation of bundles to buyers such
that each buyer receives at most one bundle and a good fraction of the social welfare is achieved.
Given such a bundling, we are essentially left with a “unit-demand” setting4 for which a prophet
inequality can be constructed using the techniques described above. We call such an allocation a
unit allocation. The main technical depth of this result lies in constructing such a bundling.
In fact, it is straightforward to construct a bundling that leads to an O(logL) competitive
ratio:5 pick a random power of 2 between 1 and L; partition items into intervals of that length
starting with a random offset; and construct an optimal allocation that allocates entire bundles in
the constructed partition. However, our improved O(logL/ log logL) approximation requires much
more care in partitioning items into bundles of many different sizes, and requires the partitioning
to be done in a distribution-dependent manner.
As mentioned earlier, the path preferences setting generalizes interval preferences, but appears
to be much harder. In particular, we don’t know how to obtain a constant competitive ratio even
when all desired paths are of equal length. We show, however, that if all buyers have equal values
and all edges have equal capacity, it becomes possible to identify up to two most contentious edges
on every path, and the problem behaves like one where every buyer desires only two items. For this
special case, it becomes possible to construct a pricing using techniques from [15]. Unfortunately,
this argument falls apart when different items have different multiplicity. In order to deal with
3 Consider, for concreteness, the following example due to Feldman et al. Suppose there are two buyers and L
items; the first has value 1 for any non-empty allocation (i.e., is unit-demand with value 1 for every item), and
the second has value L − ε for the set of all items and value zero for every subinterval. Observe that for any item
prices, either the first buyer will be willing to purchase some item, thereby blocking the second buyer from purchasing
anything, or else the second buyer will be unwilling to purchase the full set of items. As the optimal welfare is L− ε,
no item prices lead to better than an O(L)-approximation.
4A buyer is said to have unit-demand preferences if he desires buying at most one item. In our context, buyers
may desire buying multiple bundles, but the “optimum” we compare against allocates at most one to each buyer.
This allows for the same charging arguments that work in the unit-demand case.
5A detailed discussion of this solution can be found in [18].
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multiplicities, we present a different kind of partitioning of items into bundles or layers and a
constrained allocation that we call a layered allocation, such that each layer behaves like a unit-
capacity setting. These ideas altogether lead to an O(logH) competitive ratio.
As mentioned previously, our approach lends itself to achieving tradeoffs between item supply
and competitive ratio. On the one hand, when different items are available to different extents, we
need to be careful in constructing a partition into bundles and in some places this complicates our
arguments. On the other hand, large supply allows us some flexibility in partitioning the instance
into multiple smaller instances, leading to improved competitive ratios. The key to enabling this
partitioning is a composability property of our analysis: suppose we have multiple disjoint instances
of items and buyers, for each of which in isolation our argument provides a good welfare guarantee;
then running these instances together and allowing buyers to purchase bundles from any instance
provides at least half the sum of the individual welfares. In the path preferences setting, obtaining
this composability crucially requires buyers to be single-minded.
Discussion and open questions. Two implications of our results seem worthy of further study.
First, for the settings we consider as well as those studied previously, posted pricings perform nearly
as well as arbitrary online algorithms, truthful or not. Can this be formalized into a meta-theorem
that holds for broader contexts? Second, a modest increase in supply brings about significant
improvements in competitive ratio for the settings we study. However, once the competitive ratio
hits a certain constant factor, our techniques do not provide any further improvement. Can this
tradeoff be extended all the way to a 1 +  competitive ratio?
Another natural open problem is to extend our guarantees for the path preferences setting
to general graphs. This appears challenging. Our arguments rely on a fractional relaxation of
the optimal allocation. General graphs exhibit an integrality gap that is polynomial in the size
of the graph even when all buyers are single-minded, have the same values (0 or 1 with some
probability), and have identical path lengths; this integrality gap is driven by the combinatorial
structure exhibited by paths in graphs. Indeed this setting appears to be as hard as the most
general setting with no constraints on buyers’ values. It may nevertheless be possible to obtain a
non-trivial competitive ratio relative to a different relaxation of the offline optimum.
Other related work. Sequential pricing mechanisms (SPMs) were first studied for the problem of
revenue maximization, where computing the optimal mechanism is a computationally hard problem
and no simple characterizations of optimal mechanisms are known. A series of works (e.g., [8, 5,
9, 10, 3, 24, 7, 6]) showed that in settings where buyers have subadditive values, SPMs achieve
constant-factor approximations to revenue. In most interesting settings, good approximations to
revenue necessarily require non-anonymous pricings. As a result, techniques in this literature are
quite different from those for welfare. [16] gives (non-truthful) online algorithms which obtain
constant-factor approximations in our settings when supply is unit-capacity, buyers are single-
minded, and all values are identical. There is also a long line of work on welfare-maximizing
mechanisms with buyers arriving online in the worst case setting where the seller has no prior
information about buyers’ values [23, 17, 13, 1, 2, 11]. The worst case setting generally exhibits
very different techniques and results relative to the Bayesian setting we study.
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2 Model and definitions
We consider a setting with n buyers and a set of items T . We index buyers by i and items by t (or
e for edges). Buyer i’s valuation function is denoted vi : 2
T → <+, with vi(∅) = 0. Our setting is
Bayesian: vi is drawn from a distribution Fi that is independent of other buyers and known to the
seller. We emphasize that values may be correlated across bundles, but not across buyers. Let Bt
denote the number of copies available, a.k.a. supply or capacity, for item t. Let B = mintBt. The
unit-capacity setting is a special case where B = 1. An allocation is an assignment of bundles of
items to buyers such that no item is allocated more than its number of copies available. Our goal
is to maximize the buyers’ total welfare—that is, the sum over values each buyer derives from his
allocated bundle.
Jobs. We now describe assumptions and notational shortcuts for buyers’ value functions that
hold without loss of generality and simplify exposition. First, we assume that values are monotone:
for all i and vi, and all bundles S ⊂ S′ ⊆ T , vi(S) ≤ vi(S′). Second, we assume that each buyer’s
value distribution is a discrete distribution6 with finite support. In other words, each buyer i can
only have finitely many possible valuation functions: with probability qvi , buyer i’s values are given
by the known function vi.
Third, we think of a buyer i with value function vi as being a collection of “jobs” represented
by tuples (i, vi, S), one for each bundle S of items desired by the buyer. Informally, each job is a
potential (minimal) allocation to a buyer with a given value.7 Let Jvi = {(i, vi, S)} denote the set
of all such jobs for a buyer i with value function vi; let U denote the union of these sets over all
possible buyers and value functions. When a buyer i with value vi arrives, we interpret this event
as the simultaneous arrival of all of the jobs in Jvi . If the buyer is allocated the bundle S, we say
that job (i, vi, S) is allocated. In what follows, it will be convenient to consider jobs as fundamental
entities. We therefore identify a job (i, vi, S) by the single index j. Then Ij is the corresponding
bundle of items, vj is vi(Ij), and qj is qvi .
Interval and path preferences. In the interval preferences setting, the set T of items is to-
tally ordered, and buyers assign values to intervals of items. In particular, for any bundle S of
items, vi(S) = maxintervals I⊆S vi(I) where I ranges over all contiguous intervals contained in T .
Accordingly, jobs as defined above also correspond to intervals. In the path preferences setting, T
corresponds to the set of edges in a given tree. Each buyer i has a fixed and known path, denoted
Pi, and a scalar (random) value vi, with vi(S) = vi for S ⊃ Pi and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, buyers
are single-minded and each instantiated value function of a buyer is associated with a single job.
Bundle pricings. The mechanisms we study are static and anonymous bundle pricings. Let
p denote such a pricing function. For the interval preferences setting, we partition the multiset
of items into disjoint intervals and price each interval in the partition. For the path preferences
setting, we partition items into disjoint “layers” and construct a different pricing function for each
layer, which assigns a price to every path contained in that layer.8 Observe that different copies of
6For constructive versions of our results, we require the supports of the distributions to be explicitly given, however,
our arguments about the existence of a good pricing work also for continuous distributions.
7In particular we remove “duplicates”, or bundles S such that for some S′ ( S, vi(S′) = vi(S).
8The pricing is essentially a layer-specific item pricing, with bundle totals subject to a layer-specific reserve price.
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an item end up in different bundles/layers, and may therefore be priced differently. Buyers arrive
in adversarial order. When buyer i arrives, he selects a subset of remaining unsold bundles to
maximize his value for the items contained in the subset minus the total payment as specified by
the pricing p.
Let Opt denote the hindsight/offline optimal expected social welfare, and SW(p) denote the ex-
pected social welfare obtained by the static, anonymous bundle pricing p.
A fractional relaxation. A fractional allocation x assigns an xj-fraction of each item in Ij to
job j.9 A fractional allocation is feasible if it satisfies the supply and demand constraints of the
integral problem: no item may be allocated more than Bt times and no buyer obtains additional
value for more than one bundle. Let F denote the polytope defined by constraints (1)–(3) below.∑
j:Ij3t
xj ≤ Bt ∀t (supply) (1)∑
j∈Jvi
xj ≤ qvi ∀vi (demand) (2)
x ≥ 0 (3)
For any x, FracVal(x) is the total fractional value in x (without regard for feasibility), and
FracWt(x) is the total fractional weight of x:
FracVal(x) =
∑
j
vjxj and FracWt(x) =
∑
j
xj .
For a subset A of jobs, we use xA (and sometimes (x,A)) to denote the fractional allocation confined
to set A and zeroed out everywhere else. That is, (xA)j = xj for j ∈ A and (xA)j = 0 for j 6∈ A.
FracVal(xA) =
∑
j∈A
vjxj and FracWt(xA) =
∑
j∈A
xj .
Fractional allocations provide an upper bound on the optimal welfare; see Section 7 for the proof
of a more general statement (Lemma 6.1). Here FracOpt := maxx∈F FracVal(x).
Lemma 2.1. FracOpt ≥ Opt.
3 Bundle Pricing for Interval Preferences
In this section we present our main results, Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, for the interval preferences setting.
We begin by defining a special kind of fractional allocations that we call fractional unit allocations.
These have properties that guarantee the existence of a bundle-pricing mechanism which obtains a
good fraction of the welfare of the fractional allocation. The intent is to decompose the fractional
allocation across disjoint bundles such that the fractional value assigned to each bundle can be
recovered by pricing that bundle individually. Section 3.1 presents a definition of unit allocations
and their connection to pricing.
9Note that fractional allocations are used only in determining prices and in bounding the expected optimal (integer)
solution, not in the mechanism itself.
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The remaining technical content of this section then focuses on designing fractional unit al-
locations. We begin with the special case of unit-capacities in Section 3.2, where we show the
existence of an O(logL/ log logL)-approximate fractional unit allocation. In Section 3.3 we extend
our analysis to the general case of arbitrary multiplicities, proving Theorem 1.1. Finally, in Sec-
tion 3.4 we show that if the capacity for every item is large enough, specifically at least B, then
the approximation ratio decreases by a factor of Θ(B) (Theorem 1.2).
3.1 Fractional unit allocations
Definition 3.1. A fractional allocation x is a fractional unit allocation if there exists a partition
of the multiset of items (where item t has multiplicity Bt) into bundles {T1, T2, T3, · · · }, and a
corresponding partition of jobs j ∈ U with xj > 0 into sets {A1, A2, A3, · · · }, such that:
• For all j ∈ U with xj > 0, there is exactly one index k with j ∈ Ak.
• For all k and j ∈ Ak, Ij ⊆ Tk.
• For all k, we have FracWt(xAk) ≤ 1.
A note on the terminology: we call fractional allocations satisfying the above definition unit
allocations because once the partition of items is specified, each job can be assigned at most one
bundle in the partition and each bundle can be fractionally assigned to at most one job.
We note that given any fractional unit allocation x, for any instantiation of values, it is possible
to define a pricing function over the bundles Tk that is (1, 1)-balanced with respect to x within
the framework of [14]. This is because fractional unit allocations behave essentially like feasible
allocations for unit-demand buyers. For completeness we present a simpler first-principles argument
based on the techniques of Feldman et al. [15] showing that such a pricing obtains at least half the
value of the fractional unit allocation. The proof is deferred to Section 7.
Lemma 3.1. For any feasible fractional unit allocation x, there exists a static, anonymous bundle
pricing p such that
SW(p) ≥ 1
2
FracVal(x).
3.2 The unit capacity setting
The main claim of this section is that for any feasible fractional allocation x there exists a frac-
tional unit allocation x′ such that FracVal(x) ≤ O(β)FracVal(x′) where β is defined such that
β log β = logL. Then, if x is the optimal fractional allocation for the given instance, we can apply
Lemma 3.1 to the allocation x′ to obtain a pricing that gives an O(β) approximation. Observe that
β = O
( logL
log logL
)
, so we get the desired approximation factor. A formal statement of this claim is
given at the end of this subsection.
Before we prove the claim, let us discuss the intuition behind our analysis. One approach
for producing a fractional unit allocation is to find an appropriate partition of items into disjoint
intervals {T1, T2, · · · }, and remove from x all jobs that do not fit neatly into one of the intervals.
We can then rescale the fractional allocations of jobs within each interval Ti, so that their total
fractional weight is 1. The challenge in carrying out this approach is that if the intervals Ti are too
short, then they leave out too much value in the form of long jobs. On the other hand, if they are
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too long, then we may require a large renormalizing factor for the weight, again reducing the value
significantly.
To account for these losses in a principled manner we consider a suite of nested partitions, one
at each length scale, of which there are logL in number.10 We then place a job of length ` in the
interval that contains it (if one exists) at length scale ∼ 2`. The intervals over all of the length
scales together capture much of the fractional value of the allocation x. Furthermore, the fractional
weight within each interval can be bounded by a constant. At this point, any single partition gives
us a fractional unit allocation. However, since the number of length scales is logL, picking a single
one of these unit allocations only gives an O(logL) approximation in the worst case. In order to
do better, we argue that there are two possibilities: either (1) it is the case that many intervals
have a much larger than average contribution to total weight, in which case grouping these together
provides a good unit allocation; or, (2) it is the case that most intervals have low total weight, so
that we can put together multiple length scales to obtain a unit allocation without incurring a large
renormalization factor for weight.
We now proceed to prove the claim. The proof consists of modifying x to obtain x′ through
a series of refining steps. Steps 1 and 2 define the suite of partitions and placement of jobs into
intervals as discussed above. Step 3 provides a criterion for distinguishing between the cases (1)
and (2) above. Step 4 then provides an analysis of case (1), and Step 5 an analysis of case (2).
Step 1: Filtering low value jobs
We first filter out jobs that do not contribute enough to the solution x depending on when they
are scheduled. Accordingly, we define:
• For each job j, the value density of j is ρj = vj/|Ij |.
• For each item t, the fractional value at t is valt(x) =
∑
j:Ij3t ρjxj . Note FracVal(x) =∑
t valt(x). We drop the argument x when it is clear from the context.
• For any set of items I (that may or may not be an interval), define val (I) = ∑t∈I valt.
In this step, we remove from consideration jobs with fractional value less than half the total
fractional value of their interval. In particular, let U1 = {j : vj ≥ 12val (Ij)}. The following lemma
shows that we do not lose too much value in doing so.
Lemma 3.2. For any fractional allocation x and the set of jobs U1 as defined above, we have
FracVal(xU1) ≥
1
2
FracVal(x).
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is a simple counting argument and we defer it to Section 7.
Step 2: Bucketing
In the rest of the argument, we will group jobs according to both their value and the length of their
interval. Let ` ∈ {1, · · · , dlogLe+ 1} denote a length scale, and let a ∈ {1, · · · , dlog vmaxe} denote
a value scale. We will further partition jobs of similar length across non-overlapping intervals.
10All of our arguments extend trivially to settings where L denotes the ratio of lengths of the largest to the smallest
interval of interest, because the number of relevant length scales is logarithmic in this ratio.
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t0 + 1 t0 + `max + 1
I`max,0
I`max−1,0 I`max−1,1
I`max−2,0 I`max−2,1 I`max−2,2 I`max−2,3
j1
j2
j3
Figure 1: Bucketing jobs by length as in Step 2. Jobs j1 and j2 have length scale 2`max (i.e., lengths between
2`max−2, exclusive, and 2`max−1, inclusive) and will therefore be assigned to bucket I`max,0. Job j3, however,
will be dropped; it has length scale `max − 2, but does not fit entirely within any bucket at that scale.
Accordingly, let t0 be an offset picked u.a.r. from [2
`max ] where `max = dlogLe + 1. The partition
corresponding to length scale ` then consists of length-2` intervals {I`,k}k∈Z where
I`,k := [t0 + k2
` + 1, t0 + (k + 1)2
`].
See Figure 1.
We are now ready to define job groups formally. Group G`,k,a consists of every job j of length
between 2`−2 and 2`−1 and value between 2a−1 and 2a whose interval lies within the kth interval
at length scale `: Ij ⊆ I`,k. We say that the jobs in G`,k,a are assigned to interval I`,k.
G`,k,a := {j : dlog |Ij |e = `− 1
∧
dlog vje = a
∧
Ij ⊆ I`,k}
G`,k denotes all the jobs “assigned” to I`,k: G`,k =
⋃
aG`,k,a.
Observe that our choice of the offset t0 may cause us to drop some jobs, in particular those
that do not fit neatly into one of the intervals in the partition corresponding to the relevant length
scale. Let U2 =
⋃
`,k,aG`,k,a. The next lemma bounds the loss in value at this step.
Lemma 3.3. For any fractional allocation x and with U1 and U2 defined as above, FracVal(xU2) ≥
1
2FracVal(xU1).
Proof. Recall that t0 is chosen u.a.r. from 2
`max . Moreover, the length of any job j is at most half
the length of the intervals at the scale at which j is considered for bucketing. Therefore, j survives
with probability at least 1/2.
Step 3: Classification into heavy-weight and light-weight sets of jobs
We first discuss the intuition behind Steps 3 and 4. Consider a single group G`,k,a. Let us assume
briefly, for simplicity, that all jobs in this group have the same value v. Recall that all of the jobs
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j ∈ G`,k,a by virtue of being in U1 satisfy the property that val (Ij) ≤ 2vj = 2v. Furthermore,
since every job j ∈ G`,k,a is of size at least 2`−2 whereas the interval covered by G`,k,a, namely I`,k,
is of size 2`, the total fractional value of I`,k is
11 comparable to v. Therefore, as long as the jobs
in the group G`,k,a have sufficient total fractional weight, this group of jobs alone would recover
(a constant fraction of) the fractional value of the interval I`,k. In other words, we could then
immediately throw away jobs in other groups (corresponding to other length or value scales) that
overlap with this interval. Step 3 filters out such “heavy-weight” groups of jobs and in Step 4 we
argue that these groups form a good unit allocation. Intervals that do not have any length scales
with heavy-weight groups of jobs are relegated to Step 5.
We now present the details of this argument. First, for every group G`,k,a, we break the group
up into contiguous components. Observe, in particular, that the set of items covered by jobs in
G`,k,a, namely
⋃
j∈G`,k,a Ij , may not be an interval itself but is composed of at most three disjoint
intervals because each contiguous component has length at least a quarter of |I`,k|. Consider each
of the at most three corresponding sets of overlapping jobs. We will use G
(i)
`,k,a for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} to
denote these sets. For any such set G of overlapping jobs, let IG =
⋃
j∈G Ij denote the interval of
items it covers.
Next, we classify these sets of jobs into heavy-weight or light-weight. In the following definition,
we hide the arguments `, k, a, i to simplify notation.
H := {G : FracWt(xG) ≥ 1/6β} L := {G : FracWt(xG) < 1/6β}
The following fact is immediate:
Fact 3.4.
∑
G∈HFracVal(xG) +
∑
G∈LFracVal(xG) ≥ FracVal(xU2).
We will now proceed to construct two fractional unit allocations, one of which extracts the value
of the heavy-weight sets (see Step 4), and the other extracts the value of the light-weight sets (see
Step 5).
Step 4: Extracting the value of heavy-weight intervals
Consider any heavy-weight set G ∈ H (with the arguments `, a, etc. being implicit). The following
lemma is implicit in the discussion above and follows from the observations that (1) all jobs in G
are high-value jobs (that is, they belong to U1); (2) they have roughly the same value (within a
factor of 2); (3) the interval IG can be covered by at most 6 such jobs; and (4) the total weight of
G, FracWt(xG), is at most 1/6β by the definition of heavy-weight sets.
Lemma 3.5. For all j ∈ G, vj ≥ 112val (IG), and therefore FracVal(xG) ≥ 172βval (IG).
There are two remaining issues in going from the allocation x⋃HG to a unit-allocation. First,
the intervals {IG}G∈H overlap, and second, the fractional weight of G can be larger than 1. The
second issue can be dealt with by rescaling x by an appropriate factor. To deal with the first, we
state the following simple lemma without proof.
Lemma 3.6. For any given collection C of intervals, one can efficiently construct two sets S1, S2 ⊆
C such that
11To be precise, the total value of
⋃
j∈G`,k,a Ij in this case is at most 8v.
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• S1 (and likewise S2) is composed of disjoint intervals; that is, I ∩ I ′ = ∅ for all I 6= I ′ ∈ S1.
• Together they cover the entire collection C; that is, ⋃I∈S1∪S2 I = ⋃I∈C I.
We can now put these lemmas together to construct a unit allocation that covers the fractional
value of heavy-weight intervals.
Lemma 3.7. There exists a fractional unit allocation x˜H such that∑
G∈H
FracVal(xG) ≤ O(β)FracVal(x˜H).
Proof. Apply Lemma 3.6 to the collection {IG}G∈H to obtain sets S1 and S2. We think of S1 and
S2 as sets of groups in H. Assume without loss of generality that S1 has larger fractional value
than S2. Let x˜H be the fractional allocation x⋃
G∈S1 G
scaled down by a factor of 4. Then we have:
FracVal(x˜H) =
1
4
FracVal(x,∪G∈S1G) ≥
1
O(β)
∑
G∈S1
val (IG)
≥ 1
O(β)
val (∪G∈HIG) ≥ 1
O(β)
∑
G∈H
FracVal(xG).
Here the first inequality follows from applying Lemma 3.5 to every G ∈ S1, and the fact that
intervals in S1 are disjoint. The second inequality follows by recalling that the intervals in S1 and
S2 together cover the collection{IG}G∈H, and so, val (∪G∈S1IG) ≥ 12val (∪G∈HIG).
It remains to show that x˜H is a unit allocation. To see this, consider the partition of jobs into
groups G in S1. The corresponding collection of intervals {IG}G∈S1 forms a partition of the items
by virtue of the fact that the intervals corresponding to groups in S1 are disjoint. It remains to
argue that FracWt(x˜H, G) ≤ 1, that is, FracWt(xG) ≤ 4 for all G ∈ H.
To prove this claim, observe that since each job in G has length at least a quarter of the length
of IG, we can find up to four items in IG such that each job in G contains at least one of the four
items in its interval. Since x is a feasible fractional allocation, the total weight of all jobs containing
any one of those items is at most 1, and therefore the total weight of jobs in G altogether is at
most 4.
Step 5: Extracting the value of light-weight intervals
We now consider the light-weight groups G
(i)
`,k,a. As discussed at the beginning of this section, in
order to obtain a good approximation from these sets, we must construct a unit allocation out of
jobs at multiple length scales.
Define G˜`,k,a =
⋃{G(i)`,k,a ∈ L} to be the set of all jobs in I`,k with value scale a that belong to
light-weight groups. Let G˜`,k =
⋃
a G˜`,k,a denote all light-weight jobs assigned to I`,k. Since each
individual group G
(i)
`,k,a in L has total weight at most 1/6β, we have that FracWt(G˜`,k,a) ≤ 1/2β.
In order to obtain a partition of jobs and items, we would now like to associate a single set of jobs
with each partition I`,k that is simultaneously high value and low weight. Unfortunately, the set
G˜`,k may have very large total weight since it combines together many low weight sets. We use
the fact that the values of jobs in these low weight sets increase geometrically to argue that it is
possible to extract a subset of jobs from G˜`,k that is both light-weight (i.e. has total weight at most
1/β) and captures a large fraction of the total value in G˜`,k.
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Lemma 3.8. For each interval I`,k, there exists a set of jobs S`,k ⊆ G˜`,k such that
i. FracWt(x, S`,k) ≤ 1β and
ii. FracVal(x, S`,k) ≥ 16FracVal(x, G˜`,k).
We defer the proof of Lemma 3.8 to Section 7. The remainder of our analysis then hinges on
the fact that if we consider the partition into intervals at some length scale `, namely {I`,k}k∈Z,
and consider for every interval in this partition the set of all jobs in this interval at the log β length
scales below `, the total fractional weight of these jobs is at most 1. We therefore obtain a unit
allocation while capturing the fractional value in log β consecutive scales.
Lemma 3.9. There exists a fractional unit allocation x˜L such that∑
G∈L
FracVal(xG) ≤ O
(
logL
log β
)
FracVal(x˜L).
We defer the proof of Lemma 3.9 to Section 7.
Putting everything together
Combining Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, Fact 3.4, and Lemmas 3.7 and 3.9, we get that the better of the
two unit allocations x˜L and x˜H provides an O(β) approximation to the total fractional value of x,
where we used the fact that logL/ log β = β.
Theorem 3.10. For every fractional allocation x for the unit-capacity setting, there exists a frac-
tional unit allocation x′ such that
FracVal(x) ≤ O(logL/ log logL)FracVal(x′).
3.3 Extension to arbitrary capacities
We will now give a reduction from the setting with arbitrary item multiplicities to the unit-capacity
case discussed in the previous section. Once again we start with an arbitrary fractional allocation x
and construct a unit allocation x′ with large fractional value. The main idea behind the reduction
is to first partition the fractional allocation x into “layers”. Layer r corresponds to the rth copy of
each item (if it exists). Each job is assigned to one layer, with its fractional allocation appropriately
scaled down, in such a manner that the layers together capture much of the fractional value of x.
We then apply Theorem 3.10 to each layer separately, obtaining unit allocations for each layer.
The union of these unit allocations immediately gives us a unit allocation overall.
Theorem 3.11. For every feasible fractional allocation x in the interval preferences setting with
arbitrary capacities, there exists a fractional unit allocation x′, such that
FracVal(x) ≤ O(logL/ log logL)FracVal(x′).
Proof. We begin by defining layers. Recall that Bt denotes the number of copies of item t that
are available. We assume without loss of generality that Bt = d
∑
j:t∈Ij xje for all t (and otherwise
redefine Bt to be the latter quantity). Let Bmax = maxtBt. Then we define the rth layer for
r ∈ [Bmax] as Yr := {t ∈ T : Bt ≥ r}.
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We will now construct a fractional allocation x˜(r) for each layer Yr with the properties that (i)
for each r, x˜(r) is feasible with respect to the set of items in Yr, and (ii)
∑
r FracVal(x˜
(r)) ≥
1
4FracVal(x).
We proceed via induction over Bmax. For the base case, suppose that Bmax ≤ 4. Then we define
x˜(1) = 14x and x˜
(r) = 0 for all r > 1. Observe that both the properties (i) and (ii) are satisfied
by this definition. For the inductive step, we pick a set S of jobs as given by the following lemma
(proved in Section 7).
Lemma 3.12. For any feasible fractional allocation x in the interval preferences setting with
arbitrary capacities, one can efficiently construct a set S of jobs such that the total fractional
weight of xS at any item t is at least min{1, Bt} and at most 4. Formally, for all items t,
min{1, Bt} ≤
∑
j∈S:t∈Ij xj < 4.
Having constructed such a set S, we set x˜(1) = 14xS , and recursively construct allocations for
the remaining layers using x − xS . Observe that 14xS is feasible for Y1 by the definition of S.
Furthermore, by removing jobs in S from x, we reduce Bmax by at least 1, and therefore, we can
apply the inductive hypothesis to construct allocations for the remaining layers. This provides us
with (i) and (ii) as desired above.
Finally, for each layer Yr, we apply Theorem 3.10 to the allocation x˜
(r) to obtain a fractional
unit allocation x′(r) for that layer. Then, the allocation x′ =
∑
r x
′(r) is a fractional unit allocation
with FracVal(x) ≤ O(β)FracVal(x).
Combining Theorem 3.11 with Lemmas 2.1 and 3.1 immediately implies Theorem 1.1, which
we state here for completeness.
Theorem 1.1. For the interval preferences setting, there exists a static, anonymous bundle pricing
with competitive ratio O
(
logL
log logL
)
for social welfare.
3.4 The large markets setting
In this section we consider the setting where every item is available in large supply. Specifically, let
B := mintBt. We show that as B increases, the approximation ratio achieved by bundle pricing
gradually decreases.
Theorem 1.2. For the interval preferences setting, if every item has at least B > 0 copies available,
then a static, anonymous bundle pricing achieves a competitive ratio of
O
(
1
B
logL
log logL− logB
)
when B < logL, and O(1) otherwise.
Proof. Let k = 12 min{B, logL} and α = L1/k. We will partition both the item supply and the jobs
into multiple instances, such that on the one hand, the fractional solution confined to jobs within
an instance will be feasible for the item supply in that instance; on the other hand, within each
instance job lengths will differ by a factor of at most α. Then, applying Theorem 3.11 will give
us a fractional unit allocation for every instance with a factor of Ω
( log logα
logα
)
loss in social welfare.
Applying Lemma 3.1 to the union of these unit allocations then implies the theorem.
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Let x∗ be the optimal fractional allocation. Divide all jobs into k groups U1, · · · , Uk according
to length: Ui contains all jobs of length between α
i−1 and αi. Let xi denote the allocation x∗
confined to the set Ui scaled by 1/2, that is, xi =
1
2x
∗
Ui
. We now specify the supply for instance i.
Let
Bit =
12
∑
j∈Ui:t∈Ij
x∗j

Note that no item is over-provisioned (although some supply may be wasted) :
k∑
i=1
Bit ≤
k∑
i=1
1 + 1
2
∑
j∈Ui:t∈Ij
x∗j
 ≤ k + 1
2
Bt ≤ Bt.
Note also that xi is feasible for the supply {Bit}.
Applying Theorem 3.11 and Lemma 3.1 to the instances defined above then implies an approx-
imation factor of O
(
logα
log logα
)
, which is O
(
1
B
logL
log logL−logB
)
for B < logL, and O(1) otherwise.
4 Lower Bounds
We now turn to lower bounds. In this section, we ignore incentive constraints and bound the social
welfare that can be achieved by any online algorithm for the online resource allocation problem.
We consider the case of interval preferences in Section 4.1 and path preferences in Section 4.2.
4.1 Lower bound for interval preferences
We focus on the special case where every buyer is single minded. That is, for all i and vi ∼ Fi,
there exists an interval I and a scalar v such that vi(I
′) = v for all I ′ ⊇ I and 0 otherwise. This
setting is also called online interval scheduling. A lower bound for the unit-capacity version of this
problem was previously developed by Im and Wang [18]. Although Im and Wang’s focus was on
the secretary-problem version (i.e. with random arrival order and adversarial values rather than
worst-case arrival order and stochastic values), their lower bound construction uses jobs drawn
independently from a fixed distribution, and it thus provides a lower bound for the Bayesian
adversarial order setting as well. We restate Im and Wang’s result; our proof of Theorem 1.3 builds
upon this result.
Lemma 4.1. (Restated from Theorem 1.3 in [18]) For the unit-capacity setting of the online interval
scheduling problem, every randomized online algorithm has a competitive ratio of Ω
(
logL
log logL
)
.
Theorem 1.3. For the online interval scheduling problem, every randomized online algorithm has
approximation ratio Ω
(
logL
B log logL
)
, where B = mintBt.
Proof. We argue that if there exists an online algorithm with competitive ratio α = o
(
logL
B log logL
)
for the setting with minimum capacity B, then we can construct an online algorithm for the unit-
capacity setting with competitive ratio O(Bα) = o
(
logL
log logL
)
, contradicting Lemma 4.1 above.
Our main tool is the following lemma which shows that, for any set of intervals, if the intervals
arrive in arbitrary order, there exists an online algorithm that colors them (i.e. such that no two
overlapping intervals have the same color) using not many more colors than optimal.
15
Lemma 4.2. (Restated from Theorem 5 in [20]) For any set of intervals U such that every point
belongs to at most B intervals in U , there exists an online coloring algorithm B utilizing at most
3B − 2 colors.
Suppose that for some B > 1 there exists an online algorithm A for markets of size B with
competitive ratio α = o
( logL
B log logL
)
. Consider the following algorithm A ′ for the unit-capacity
setting. Let c be an integer chosen u.a.r. from [3B − 2]. As each buyer i arrives, if A accepts i,
then input Ii to B; if B assigns color c to Ii, then accept i.
By Lemma 4.2, the expected value of intervals with color c is a 13B−2 -fraction of the social welfare
obtained by A . Thus the approximation ratio of A ′ for the unit-capacity setting is (3B − 2)α =
o
( logL
log logL
)
, which contradicts Lemma 4.1.
4.2 Lower bound for path preferences
In this section, we show that for the “online path scheduling” problem on trees no online algorithm
can achieve subpolynomial approximation with respect to L, the length of the longest possible path
in the instance.
Theorem 4.3. There exists an instance of the path preferences setting, where every buyer desires a
path of length between 1 and L, for which every randomized online algorithm has competitive ratio
Ω
(√
L
logL
)
for social welfare.
Proof. Consider a complete binary tree with height L and capacity 1 on every edge in the tree.
We will define an instance with a unique buyer for every (node, leaf) pair in the tree where the
leaf belongs to the subtree rooted at the node. Formally, define the level of edges bottom-up: for
example, the leaf edges (i.e. edges adjacent to a leaf node) have level 0, and the edges adjacent to
root have level L− 1. There are n` = 2L−` edges at level `, and each of these edges has 2` leaves in
its subtree. For every level `, every edge e at level `, and every leaf edge e′ in the subtree rooted
at e, our instance contains a unique buyer that arrives independently with probability 1
2`
and has
value v` = 2
`. We say that the buyer is at level `. Note that there are exactly 2L distinct buyers
at each level `, and therefore L2L buyers in all.
Let us now compute the offline optimal welfare Opt for this instance. We claim Opt = Ω(L2L).
Consider a greedy allocation that admits buyers in order from the highest to the lowest level: every
buyer whose path is still available when considered gets allocated with probability 1/2. Note that
when a level ` path beginning with edge e is considered, it can be allocated if and only if e is not
allocated to previous buyers. We now make two observations. First, the expected number of buyers
at level `′ > ` whose paths contain e and that arrive is at most
∑
`′>` 2
`/2`
′
< 1. So, the probability
that an edge e is allocated prior to considering buyers at its level is at most 1/2. Second, if prior to
considering level ` buyers, edge e is available, then the probability that it gets allocated to a level
` buyer is at least 1− (1− 1
2`+1
)2
` ≥ 1− 1√
e
. Therefore, the total contribution of level ` buyers to
the social welfare is at least 12
(
1− 1√
e
)
n`v` = Ω(2
L). This proves our claim.
Next we prove via a charging argument that the welfare of any online algorithm is bounded by
O(2L
√
L logL). Assume that buyers arrive in order from lowest level to highest level. Construct a
grid with height L and width 2L as follows. Each edge at level ` corresponds to a size 1×2` rectangle
in the grid at the same level; see Figure 2. With each leaf edge, we also associate the entire column
above its cell in the grid with the edge. So each cell in the grid is indexed by a level and a column
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corresponding to a leaf edge. As buyers arrive and the online algorithm makes allocation decisions,
we mark cells in the grid to indicate availability. Initially all cells are unmarked. Whenever the
online algorithm allocates a path to a buyer at level ` with first edge e, we mark all cells in the
1 × 2` rectangle corresponding to edge e, as well as all cells above this rectangle. Now suppose
that a buyer at level ` arrives whose path begins with edge e and ends at leaf edge e′. If the cell
corresponding to column e′ and level ` in the grid is already marked, this means the buyer cannot
be legally allocated because a buyer starting at some other edge on the path from e to e′ was
previously allocated. Let m(e) be the number of unmarked cells in the rectangle corresponding to
e when buyers beginning with e start to arrive. If the online algorithm allocates to a buyer with
starting edge e, the total number of cells that get marked at this iteration is exactly (L− `)m(e).
(a)
(b)
Figure 2: (a) An example of a binary tree and its corresponding grid; (b) Jobs arrive bottom-up and get
allocated. The grid shows the cells marked by each job.
Say an edge e at level ` is “good” if when the buyers beginning with e start to arrive, we have
(L − `)m(e) ≥ 2`√L/ logL. For any buyer beginning with a good edge that is allocated by the
algorithm, it marks a rectangle in the grid with area (L − `)m(e) ≥ √L/ logL · v`, i.e √L/ logL
times the value of the buyer. Since the total area of the grid is L2L, the total value of buyers with
good edges allocated in the algorithm is at most 1√
L/ logL
L2L = 2L
√
L logL.
Now consider the welfare contributed by buyers at bad edges. At any such bad edge e at level
`, at most m(e) buyers beginning with e can get allocated; the expected number of such buyers
that arrive is at most m(e)
2`
<
√
L/ logL
L−` . Thus their total welfare contribution is at most
L−1∑
`=0
n`v` ·
√
L/ logL
L− ` = 2
L
√
L/ logL
L−1∑
`=0
1
L− ` = O(2
L
√
L logL).
Summing up the total welfare contribution from buyers at good and bad edges gives us a bound
of O(2L
√
L logL) on the total welfare obtained by any online algorithm.
17
5 Bundle Pricings for Path Preferences
We now turn to the path preferences setting. Recall that here the items correspond to edges in
a fixed tree. Each buyer i desires a path Pi ⊂ T . Our techniques for this setting are similar to
those in Section 3 — we construct a partition of the items into layers, construct a corresponding
fractional allocation that respects this layer structure in that every buyer is allocated items from
at most two layers, and no layer has too much fractional weight. We show in Section 5.2 that such
a good fractional layered allocation always exists. In Section 5.3 we show that a layered allocation
guarantees a good bundle pricing. In Section 5.4 we present the corresponding “large markets”
result, namely that the competitive ratio decreases linearly with capacity.
5.1 Fractional layered allocations
As in the case of fractional unit allocations that we defined for the interval preferences setting, we
would like to construct a partition of items into bundles and a corresponding allocation of jobs such
that each job fits cleanly into one bundle, no bundle contains too much fractional weight, and no
item belongs to more bundles than its multiplicity. Unfortunately, it turns out that due to the rich
combinatorial structure among paths in trees, such an allocation cannot be constructed without
losing too much value in the worst case.
To overcome this issue, we simplify the combinatorial structure by orienting the underlying tree
with an arbitrary root and breaking each path into two “monotone” components. Formally, for an
arbitrary rooting of the underlying tree, define the depth of an edge t ∈ T , denoted d(t), to be the
number of edges on the shortest path from the root to this edge, including t itself.12 For a job j
with corresponding path Pj , define the peak of j’s desired path to be the edge(s) closest to the root:
Λj = arg mint∈Ij{d(t)}. Let j1 and j2 denote the two subpaths of Ij that begin at one of the peak
edges in Λj and consist of all subsequent edges in Ij with increasing depth; we call these the arms
of the job. Let Pj1 and Pj1 denote the corresponding subpaths. Note that one of these arms may
be empty; in that case, we take j2 to be the empty arm.
Definition 5.1. A fractional allocation x is a fractional layered allocation if there exists a partition
of the multiset of items (where item t has multiplicity Bt) into bundles {T1, T2, T3, · · · }, and a
corresponding partition of the arms with non-zero weight under x, ∪j∈U :xj>0{j1, j2}, into sets
{A1, A2, A3, · · · }, such that:
• For all j ∈ U with xj > 0, there is exactly one index k with j1 ⊂ Ak and, if j2 is not empty,
exactly one index k′ with j2 ∈ Ak′ .
• For all k and ja ∈ Ak, Pja ⊆ Tk.
• For all k and t ∈ Tk, we have FracWt(x, {j : ja ∈ Ak and Pja 3 t}) ≤ 1.
Observe that there are two main differences between the layered allocations defined above and
fractional unit allocations as defined in Section 3.1. First, layered allocations partition arms into
layers rather than entire jobs, so a job can end up in two different layers. Second, and more
importantly, a layer can have very large total weight. All we guarantee is that the weight of any
single edge in a layer will be bounded by 1. As such, the pricing we construct is allowed to allocate
multiple subpaths of a single layer to different buyers in sequence.
12So, the edges incident on the root have depth 1.
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5.2 Layering a tree
We now show that good fractional layered allocations always exist. For a fractional allocation x,
let vmax(x) = maxj:xj>0 vj and vmin(x) = minj:xj>0 vj .
Lemma 5.1. For every feasible fractional allocation x, one can efficiently construct a feasible
layered fractional allocation y˜ such that
FracVal(x) ≤ O
(
vmax(x)
vmin(x)
)
FracVal(y˜).
Before we proceed we need more notation. For a subset of jobs (or arms) J , let EJ denote
the set of edges collectively desired by those jobs: EJ = ∪j∈JPj . For an edge t, let wt(x) :=
FracWt(x, {j : Pj 3 t}) denote the total fractional weight of jobs (or arms) whose paths contain
t. Likewise, let wt(xA) or wt(x,A) denote the fractional weight on t from jobs (or arms) in set A.
We construct the layering recursively. Informally, given a fractional allocation x, we find a set
of jobs J such that the fractional demand on any item desired by a job in J is a constant. That
is, for all t ∈ EJ , wt(x, J) ≤ c. We scale the fractional allocation of jobs in J by 1/c, and take this
scaled allocation along with the set EJ to be the first layer. We thus obtain a feasible layer, and
lose a factor of at most c in fractional value.
However, in order to apply this step recursively and arrive at a feasible layered allocation, we
need the remaining fractional solution to be feasible for the items remaining after reducing the
capacity of every item in EJ by one. Therefore, we need the fractional weight on every edge in EJ
to decrease by at least 1 (or else to zero) after removing J . It may not be possible to find a set J
which satisfies both this and the constant-demand condition described above. Instead, we find a
set D such that jobs in J and D together account for one unit of demand on every edge in EJ , and
then we drop D. Because we drop jobs in D rather than assigning them to a layer, we do not need
to ensure that the fractional weight on edges in ED decreases by any particular amount. We pick
a set D with small fractional weight relative to that of J , so that we can charge its lost fractional
value to J .
Finally, although we have informally described the argument in terms of jobs, in our formal
argument we consider sets of arms. This introduces an extra complication: when we drop the set
D of arms, we must also drop their sibling arms. We show that we can do this without losing more
than another constant factor in fractional value.
We formalize the recursive step in the following lemma; the proof is deferred to Section 7.
Lemma 5.2. Given a set U of jobs and a non-zero fractional allocation y, there exist sets of arms
J 6= ∅ and D such that
i. J ∩D = ∅;
ii. J ∩D′ = ∅, where D′ = {ja : ja′ ∈ D, a 6= a′};
iii. for all t ∈ EJ , wt(y, J ∪D) ≥ min{1,wt(y)};
iv. for all t ∈ EJ , wt(y, J) ≤ 7; and
v. FracWt(yJ) ≥ 2FracWt(yD).
Furthermore, J and D can be found efficiently.
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Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let E denote the multiset of edges, with the given multiplicities, in the given
tree. Given a set of arms U and a feasible fractional allocation x, we apply Lemma 5.2 to generate
the sets of arms J and D. Let D′ be the set of “sibling” arms of arms in D. Recall that EJ is the
set of edges contained in the paths desired by j ∈ J . Let E′ = E \EJ , and x′ = x−xJ −xD−xD′ .
First, we observe that x′ is feasible for the multiset E′ of edges. This is because on the one
hand, the multiplicity of each edge t in EJ decreases by 1. On the other hand, wt(x) −wt(x′) ≥
wt(x, J ∪D) ≥ min{1,wt(x)} by property iii. in Lemma 5.2. So, either the fractional weight on t
decreases by 1, or it is equal to 0.
We set T1 = EJ , A˜1 = J , D1 = D, and D
′
1 = D
′, and construct the remaining partition of
edges and arms by applying Lemma 5.2 recursively to allocation x′. Observe that our rescursive
applications may discard in the form of the sets D′k some arms that have previously been included
in the sets A˜k′ for k
′ < k. Define Ak = A˜k \ (∪k′D′k′). We then define y˜j = xj/7 for jobs j with
arms in ∪kAk, and 0 otherwise. It is now easy to see that y˜ is a fractional layered allocation, where
the third property follows from property iv. in Lemma 5.2.
It remains to prove that the fractional value of y˜ is large enough. Property v. in Lemma 5.2 tells
us that FracWt(x, A˜k) ≥ FracWt(x,Dk ∪D′k). Summing over k and removing the contribution
of D′k from each side, we get
FracWt(x,∪kAk) ≥ FracWt(x,∪kDk) ≥ 1
2
FracWt(x,∪k(Dk ∪D′k)),
which implies FracWt(x,∪kAk) ≥ 13FracWt(x), or FracWt(y˜) ≥ 121FracWt(x).
Finally, since the values of all jobs with positive weight under x lie in the range [vmin(x), vmax(x)],
we get that FracVal(y˜) ≥ Ω
(
vmin(x)
vmax(x)
)
FracVal(x).
5.3 From layered allocations to bundle pricings
In this section we will demonstrate the existence of a good bundle pricing given any fractional
layered allocation:
Lemma 5.3. Given a feasible fractional layered allocation y, there exists a bundle pricing p such
that
FracVal(y) ≤ O
(
vmax(y)
vmin(y)
)
SW(p).
To develop intuition for our approach consider the special case where every edge in the tree has
capacity 1 (that is, the layered allocation has a single layer), and every job has equal value. We
claim that essentially the most contentious edges in a job’s path are its peak edges – those closest
to the root. In particular, if a job gets “blocked” by another admitted job on one or more of its
peak edges, then we should try to recover its lost value in the form of revenue from the blocking
edge. What if a job gets blocked on a non-peak edge? We can then charge the lost value of this job
to the value of the blocking job—it is easy to observe that any such blocking job is charged at most
once in this manner. In effect, every job has up to two important edges, namely its peak edges,
that determine whether and to what extent the job will contribute to the solution’s revenue or its
utility. Upon focusing on these two edges, then, the instance behaves like one where every desired
bundle has size 2 and we can construct a bundle pricing that achieves a competitive ratio of O(1).
In order to convert this argument into a proof we need to deal with several complications: jobs
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have different values; different arms of a job may be allocated at different layers in the fractional
layered allocation; etc.
Proof. We start by introducing some notation. Given the fractional layered allocation y, let
{T1, T2, · · · } be the partition of items/edges into layers, and {A1, A2, · · · } be the corresponding
partition of arms. Henceforth we will think of the different copies of an edge as distinct items,
and when we refer to some edge/item e it will be understood that this edge corresponds to some
particular set Tk. For a j ∈ U with yj > 0, and for the index k such that ja ∈ Ak, we will redefine
Pja (and likewise, Pj) as the subset of edges of Tk that correspond to this arm.
13 Accordingly, we
also redefine the peak edges, Λj , of a job j with yj > 0 as the copies of its peak edges that belong
to Tk corresponding to j
a ∈ Ak. Note that we may assume without loss of generality (via rescaling,
e.g.) that vmin(y) = 1.
We are now ready to define our pricing:
• For any layer k, edge e ∈ Tk, and job j such that ja ∈ Ak, define the contribution of j to e’s
price as γej =
1
4yjvj1[e ∈ Λj ]. For all other pairs (j, e), set γej = 0.
• For any k and edge e ∈ Tk, define the price of e as pˆe =
∑
j γej .
• For any k and a bundle B ⊂ Tk that corresponds to a “monotone” path,14 define the price of
the bundle as pB = max(1,
∑
e∈B pˆe). All other bundles are priced at infinity.
Our mechanism offers the static, anonymous bundle prices p as defined above. Now consider any
instantiation of job arrivals. We consider three events related to job j:
• E1j occurs if, at the time of j’s arrival, all edges in Λj are unsold;
• E2j occurs if, after all jobs have arrived, at least one of the edges in Λj is sold;
• Gj occurs when either of the above holds: Gj = E1j ∪ E2j .
We now make the following two claims. The first bounds the contribution to the welfare of the
pricing from “good” jobs for which event Gj occurs. The second bounds the loss from the “bad”
jobs. Here Util(p) denotes the total buyer utility generated by the pricing p and Rev(p) denotes
the total revenue generated.
Claim 1.
Util(p) + 4 Rev(p) + SW(p) ≥
∑
j
yjvjPr[Gj ]− 1
2
FracVal(y). (4)
Claim 2.
2vmax(y)SW(p) ≥
∑
j
yjvjPr
[
Gj
]
. (5)
13That is, Pja corresponds to the specific copies of edges in Tk and not any copies that form the path corresponding
to this arm.
14By a monotone path we mean one that has a single peak edge.
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Given the two claims, adding Equations (4) and (5), and using the fact that SW(p) = Util(p) +
Rev(p), we have
(2vmax(y) + 5) SW(p) ≥
∑
j
yjvj − 1
2
FracVal(y) =
1
2
FracVal(y)
The theorem follows. It remains to prove the claims.
Proof of Claim 1. For a job j with yj > 0, let p(j) =
∑
e∈Pj pˆe denote the price of the “intended”
bundle for j. We first write the utility of the pricing p:
Util(p) ≥
∑
j
yjPr
[E1j ] (vj −max{1, p(j)})
=
∑
j
yjPr
[E1j ] (vj − p(j))−∑
j
yjPr
[E1j ] (1− p(j))+
=
∑
j
vjyjPr
[E1j ]−∑
j
(
yjPr
[E1j ] ∑
e∈Pj
pˆe
)−∑
j
yjPr
[E1j ] (1− p(j))+ (6)
where the inequality follows because each job is a profit-maximizer and, when not blocked, will pay
the sum of the prices (or 1) if this is less than its value.
We bound the three terms in (6) separately, beginning with the third. Note that job j always
purchases some bundle containing its path when it arrives, if event E1j occurs. Therefore, since
(1− p(j))+ ≤ 1 and the single-minded buyer’s value for any bundle containing his path is least 1,∑
j
yjPr[Aj ]
(
1− p(j))+ ≤ SW(p). (7)
For the second term, we have:
∑
j
yjPr[E1j ] ∑
e∈Pj
pˆe
 ≤∑
e
pˆe ∑
j:e∈Pj
yj
 ≤∑
e
pˆe
=
∑
e,j
γe,j =
∑
j
∑
e∈Λj
1
4
yjvj ≤ 1
2
FracVal(y) (8)
where the second inequality follows from the definition of fractional layered allocations.
We now bound the first term in (6). For edge e, let E2e denote that, after all jobs have arrived,
edge e is sold. Recall that Gj = E1j ∪ E2j = E1j ∪ (∪e∈ΛjE2e ). Therefore,
vjyj1[Gj ] ≤ vjyj1[E1j ] +
∑
e∈Λj
vjyj1[E2e ]
= vjyj1[E1j ] +
∑
e
4γej1[E2e ]
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Summing over all j, ∑
j
vjyj1[Gj ] ≤
∑
j
vjyj1[E1j ] + 4
∑
e
1[E2e ]
∑
j
γej
=
∑
j
vjyj1[E1j ] + 4
∑
e
1[E2e ]pˆe
≤
∑
j
vjyj1[E1j ] + 4Rev(p) (9)
The claim now follows by putting together Equations (6), (7), (8), and (9).
Proof of Claim 2. Fix a particular instantiation of jobs and consider a job j for which Gj does not
occur. Then j is blocked at the time of its arrival on some non-peak edge in Pj . Let e be the edge
closest to the root among all such blocking edges. Then, e is a peak edge for the job j′ that is
allocated this edge. We charge the quantity vjqj to j
′.
Now observe that all of the jobs j that are charged to some job j′ along edge e ∈ Tk contain the
parent edge of e, call it e′, in their arm ja ∈ Ak. Then we can use the fact that FracWt(y, {j :
ja ∈ Ak and Pja 3 e′}) ≤ 1 from the definition of fractional layered allocations to assert that the
total weight of such jobs is at most 1. In other words, the total charge on j′ is at most∑
j:j charges j′
vjqj ≤ vmax(y)
∑
j:j charges j′
qj ≤ 2vmax(y) ≤ 2vmax(y)vj′
where the factor of 2 arises from the fact that j′ could be charged along both of its peak edges,
and the last inequality follows by recalling that vj′ ≥ vmin(y) = 1 for any job j′ allocated by the
pricing.
The claim now follows by summing the above inequality over jobs j′ allocated by the pricing,
and taking expectations of both sides over possible instantiations. This completes the proof
of the lemma.
Armed with this lemma, we can now complete the proof of Theorem 1.4. Start with the optimal
fractional allocation y, and partition all jobs into logH value classes, where each class contains jobs
with values within a factor of 2 of each other. One of these classes, call it C, contributes more than
a logH fraction to the fractional value of y. Then, applying Lemma 5.3 to the allocation yC gives
us the following theorem.
Theorem 1.4. For the path preferences setting, there exists a static, anonymous bundle pricing
with competitive ratio O (logH) for social welfare.
5.4 The large capacity setting
In this section we consider the setting where every edge is available in large supply. Recall that
we define B := mintBt. We show that as B increases, the approximation ratio achieved by bundle
pricing gradually decreases.
Theorem 1.5. For the path preferences setting, if every edge has at least B > 0 copies available,
then a static, anonymous bundle pricing achieves a competitive ratio of O
(
1
B logH
)
for social
welfare.
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Proof. Let k = 12B and α = H
1/k. The proof technique is basically identical to that of Theorem 1.2,
where we partition both the item supply and the jobs into k instances, such that on the one hand,
the fractional solution confined to jobs within an instance will be feasible for the item supply in
that instance; on the other hand, within each instance job values will differ by a factor of at most α.
Then, applying Theorem 1.4 will give us a static, anonymous pricing for every instance individually
with a factor of Ω
(
1
logα
)
loss in social welfare. Now consider running these instances in parallel,
with each buyer allowed to purchase bundles from any of the instances. The utility-revenue analysis
in Lemma 5.3 continues to apply, providing the same guarantees on welfare. However, we may
double count some part of the welfare: suppose a buyer j is “assigned” by the layered allocation
to one instance, but purchases a bundle in another instance; then we may account for both his
contribution to utility for the first instance as well as his contribution to revenue for the second
instance. This double counting only costs us a factor of 2 in the overall welfare, and we obtain an
O(logα) = O
(
1
B logH
)
approximation.
6 Convex Production Costs with Interval Preferences
In this section we show that our results for interval preferences, in particular Theorems 1.1 and 1.2,
generalize to the setting where the seller can obtain additional copies of each item at increasing
marginal costs. In particular, we assume the seller incurs cost cti when allocating
15 the ith copy
of item t, and cti ≥ cti′ for i > i′. Note that this generalizes the fixed-capacity setting by taking
cti = 0 for i ≤ Bt and ∞ otherwise. We begin by revisiting our definition of fractional allocations
and associated notation, which we defined for fixed-capacity settings in Section 2.
In this setting, a fractional allocation x no longer need satisfy an explicit supply constraint, but
the fractional value achieved by x is different, since the costs of supply must be taken into account.
We begin by introducing notation for the cost of a given fractional allocation. For any fractional
allocation x, denote by bt(x) =
∑
j:Ij3t xj the (fractional) number of copies of item t allocated in
x. Let btr(x) be the fraction of copy r of item t sold:
btr(x) =

1 r ≤ bt(x)
bt(x)− bbt(x)c r = bbt(x)c+ 1
0 r > bbt(x)c+ 1.
For simplicity we use bt to denote bt(x) and btr to denote btr(x) in later analysis. Observe that the
total cost for all copies of item t in x is
∑
r btrctr. Then the fractional value achieved by x is
FracVal(x,~c) =
∑
j
vjxj −
∑
t,r
btrctr.
As in the fixed-capacity setting, we bound the optimal welfare by the optimal fractional welfare;
define
FracOpt := max
x
FracVal(x,~c),
where x ranges over x ≥ 0 satisfying the demand constraint (Equation 2).16 We defer our proof of
Lemma 6.1 to Section 7.
15Note that the seller can acquire items online; supply need not be provisioned before demand is realized.
16Although not stated here in this manner, FracOpt can be expressed as the optimum of a linear program.
24
Lemma 6.1. FracOpt~c ≥ Opt~c.
We now show that our analysis (theorems in Section 3 along with Lemma 3.1) extends to the
setting with convex production costs as well. We begin by updating our definition of fractional
unit allocations. Recall that unit allocations implicitly define a partition of items into bundles and
associate each job with at most one bundle. When items have production costs, the value of a
fractional unit allocation depends on which copy of each item belongs to any particular bundle in
the partition. This association of copies to bundles is not necessarily unique. So we extend the
definition of unit allocations to make the partitioning of items into bundles explicit.
Definition 6.1. A fractional unit allocation with costs is a pair (x, τ), where x is a demand-feasible
fractional allocation and τ = {τ1, τ2, τ3, · · · } is a partition of the multiset of items {(t, r)}t∈T,r∈Z+ ,
if there exists a partition of jobs j ∈ U with xj > 0 into sets {A1, A2, A3, · · · }, such that:
• For all k, the set of items contained in τk, Tk = {t : (t, r) ∈ τk}, forms an interval.
• For all j ∈ U with xj > 0, there is exactly one index k with j ∈ Ak.
• For all k and j ∈ Ak, Ij ⊆ Tk.
• For all k, we have FracWt(xAk) ≤ 1.
The fractional value of (x, τ) is defined as:
FracVal(x, τ,~c) =
∑
j
vjxj −
∑
k
∑
(t,r)∈τk
∑
j∈Ak:t∈Ij
ctrxj .
We can now state a counterpart to Lemma 3.1, with the proof deferred to Section 7.
Lemma 6.2. For any cost vector ~c and a fractional unit allocation with costs, (x, τ), there exists
an anonymous bundle pricing p such that
SW(p) ≥ 1
2
FracVal(x, τ,~c).
We emphasize that the pricing returned by the above lemma is not necessarily static. For each
bundle τk in the unit allocation (x, τ), our pricing associates a price with each interval I ⊆ Tk.
Prices for different such subsets I can be different and depend on the costs of the respective items.
When one of the intervals in τk is bought, the seller removes from the menu all other intervals
corresponding to τk. Moreover, different copies of the same bundle can have different prices,
because they cost different amounts to the seller. We leave open the question of obtaining a static
bundle pricing with a good approximation factor for this setting.
Next we state and prove a counterpart of Theorem 3.11: given any fractional allocation x we can
construct a fractional unit allocation that captures an O(logL/ log logL) fraction of the value of x.
The proof is essentially a reduction to the fixed-capacity setting. We first partition the allocation x
into “layers” as in the proof of Theorem 3.11. The fractional weight for every item in the allocation
for any single layer is at most 1. In this case, it becomes possible to apply the unit-capacity theorem
(Theorem 3.10) to construct a partition of items in that layer and a corresponding unit allocation.
Putting these layer-by-layer unit-allocations together gives us an overall fractional unit allocation.
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Lemma 6.3. For all non-decreasing costs ~c and every fractional allocation x, there exists a frac-
tional unit allocation (x′, τ) such that
FracVal(x,~c) ≤ O(logL/ log logL)FracVal(x′, τ,~c).
Lemmas 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 together imply the following upper bound for the costs setting.
Theorem 6.4. For the interval preferences setting with increasing marginal costs on items, there
exists an anonymous bundle pricing p such that
Opt ≤ O
(
logL
log logL
)
SW(p).
The lower bound of Ω
(
logL
log logL
)
also extends to the setting with costs, as the unit-capacity
setting is a special case.
7 Deferred proofs
7.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Lemma 3.1. For any feasible fractional unit allocation x, there exists a static, anonymous bundle
pricing p such that
SW(p) ≥ 1
2
FracVal(x).
Proof. Observe that we can write the social welfare of any p as the sum of the expected revenue
of the seller and the total expected utility obtained by the buyers:
SW(p) = Rev(p) +Util(p).
Let {Tk} and {Ak} be the partition of the items and jobs respectively corresponding to the unit
allocation x. For each bundle Tk, let Wk = FracWt(xAk), and set price pk =
1
2Wk
FracVal(xAk).
For this setting of prices, we will bound the revenue and utility terms separately, and show that
their sum is at least 12FracVal(x) =
1
2
∑
k FracVal(xAk).
For any realization of the buyers’ values and arrival order, let Zk indicate whether bundle k is
purchased by any buyer at these prices. The revenue term is then
Rev(p) =
∑
k
Pr[Zk = 1]pk
≥ 1
2
∑
k
Pr[Zk = 1]FracVal(xAk). (10)
The inequality follows from the fact that Wk ≤ 1 by the definition of unit allocations.
For the utility, note that buyer i with value vi will purchase an available bundle maximizing
her utility. Define kj to be the index k such that j ∈ Ak. The buyer’s utility is at least17
ui(vi) ≥ EZ
[
max
j∈Jvi
1{Zkj = 0}
(
vi(Ij)− pkj
)+]
≥ 1
qvi
∑
j∈Jvi
Pr[Zkj = 0]xj(vj − pkj )+. (11)
17Here we use the notation y+ to denote max{0, y}.
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The second inequality follows from (2).
Summing over all buyers and all valuations, we have
Util(p) ≥
∑
i,vi
qviui(vi)
≥
∑
i,vi
∑
j∈Jvi
Pr[Zkj = 0]xj(vj − pkj )+
≥
∑
k
Pr[Zk = 0]
∑
j∈Ak
xj(vj − pk)
≥
∑
k
Pr[Zk = 0]
(
FracVal(xAk)−Wkpk
)
≥
∑
k
Pr[Zk = 0]
(
FracVal(xAk)−
1
2
FracVal(xAk)
)
=
1
2
∑
k
Pr[Zk = 0]FracVal(xAk) (12)
The result now follows by summing (10) and (12).
7.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Lemma 3.2. For any fractional allocation x, there exists a set of jobs U1 as defined in Section 3.2
such that FracVal(xU1) ≥ 12FracVal(x).
Proof. We bound the total fractional value of jobs left out of U1:
∑
j 6∈U1
vjxj <
∑
j 6∈U1
1
2
∑
t∈Ij
valt
xj
=
1
2
∑
j 6∈U1
xj
∑
t∈Ij
∑
j′:Ij′3t
ρj′xj′

=
1
2
∑
t
∑
j 6∈U1
Ij3t
xj
 ∑
j′:Ij′3t
ρj′xj′
≤ 1
2
∑
t
∑
j:Ij3t
ρjxj =
1
2
FracVal(x).
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3.8
Lemma 3.8. For each interval I`,k, there exists a set of jobs S`,k ⊆ G˜`,k such that
i. FracWt(x, S`,k) ≤ 1β and
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ii. FracVal(x, S`,k) ≥ 16FracVal(x, G˜`,k).
Proof. Since all jobs in G˜`,k,a have value between 2
a−1 and 2a, we have
2a−1FracWt(x, G˜`,k,a) ≤ FracVal(x, G˜`,k,a) ≤ 2aFracWt(x, G˜`,k,a).
For every u ∈ {1, · · · , dlog vmaxe}, define Su =
∑
a≤u 2
aFracWt(x, G˜`,k,a). Then Sdlog vmaxe is an
upperbound of FracVal(x, G˜`,k). Let m be such that Sm ≤ 13Sdlog vmaxe and Sm+1 > 13Sdlog vmaxe.
Consider the following two cases.
Case 1. If Sm+1 − Sm = 2m+1FracWt(x, G˜`,k,m+1) > 13Sdlog vmaxe, then
FracVal(x, G˜`,k,m+1) ≥ 2mFracWt(x, G˜`,k,m+1)
>
1
6
Sdlog vmaxe
≥ 1
6
FracVal(x, G˜`,k).
Since FracWt(x, G˜`,k,m+1) ≤ 12β < 1β , setting S`,k = G˜`,k,m+1 satisfies both conditions of the
lemma.
Case 2. If Sm+1 − Sm ≤ 13Sdlog vmaxe, then Sm+1 ≤ 23Sdlog vmaxe, and∑
a>m+1
FracVal(x, G˜`,k,a) ≥ 1
2
(Sdlog vmaxe − Sm+1)
≥ 1
6
Sdlog vmaxe
≥ 1
6
FracVal(x, G˜`,k).
Meanwhile, note that
∑
a>m+1 2
aFracWt(x, G˜`,k,a) <
2
3Sdlog vmaxe < 2Sm+1. Then∑
a>m+1
FracWt(x, G˜`,k,a) ≤ 1
2m+2
∑
a>m+1
2aFracWt(x, G˜`,k,a)
<
1
2m+2
· 2Sm+1
=
1
2u+1
∑
a≤m+1
2aFracWt(x, G˜`,k,a)
≤ 1
2u+1
∑
a≤m+1
2a
1
2β
<
1
β
.
Thus setting S`,k =
⋃
a>m+1 G˜`,k,a satisfies both conditions of the lemma.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 3.9
Lemma 3.9. There exists a fractional unit allocation x˜L such that∑
G∈L
FracVal(xG) ≤ O
(
logL
log β
)
FracVal(x˜L).
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level `
level `− 1
level `− 2
level `− log β + 1
I`,k
I`−1,2k I`−1,2k+1
I`−2,4k I`−2,4k+1 I`−2,4k+2 I`−2,4k+3
Figure 3: Intervals associated with H`,k in Lemma 3.9. There are β − 1 intervals in the block, and
from each interval I`′,k′ ⊆ I`,k we pick a set of jobs S`′,k′ with fractional weight at most 1/β.
Proof. Fix any length scale ` and consider the partition of items into intervals I`,k. We will construct
a fractional unit allocation corresponding to this partition. We first associated with the interval
I`,k the set of all jobs contained inside this interval that have length scale between `− log β+ 1 and
`. Formally, we define
H`,k =
⋃
`′,k′:I`′,k′⊆I`,k
`′∈(`−log β,`]
S`′,k′ ,
where S`′,k′ is defined in Lemma 3.8. See Figure 3 for a graphical illustration of H`,k. Let H` =
∪kH`,k denote the set of all jobs that belong to the partition given by {H`,k}.
We now claim that xH` is a fractional unit allocation. To see this, observe that for each (`, k)
there are exactly 2log β − 1 < β pairs (`′, k′) with I`′,k′ ⊆ I`,k and `′ ∈ (`− log β, `]. H`,k is therefore
a union of at most β groups S`′,k′ . Lemma 3.8 now implies that FracWt(x,H`,k) ≤ β 1β = 1.
Lemma 3.8 also implies that the total fractional value captured by xH` is a constant fraction of
the total value of all light weight groups at length scales in (`− log β, `]:
FracVal(x,H`) =
∑
k
FracVal(x,H`,k) =
∑
k
∑
`′∈(`−log β,`]
FracVal(x, S`′,k)
≥ 1
6
∑
k
∑
`′∈(`−log β,`]
FracVal(x, G˜`′,k)
=
1
6
∑
G∈L;
G at length scale `′∈(`−log β,`]
FracVal(xG)
Now consider the d`max/ log βe length scales in {1, · · · , `max} that are multiples of log β. By
our argument above, the fractional allocations xH` corresponding to such length scales together
capture a sixth of all of the fractional value in L. Therefore, there exists some ` such that
FracVal(x,H`) ≥ Ω
(
log β
`max
)∑
G∈L
FracVal(xG).
The corresponding unit allocation xH` satisfies the requirements of the lemma.
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7.5 Proof of Lemma 3.12
Lemma 3.12. For any feasible fractional allocation x in the interval preferences setting with
arbitrary capacities, one can efficiently construct a set S of jobs such that the total fractional
weight of xS at any item t is at least min{1, Bt} and at most 4. Formally, for all items t,
min{1, Bt} ≤
∑
j∈S:t∈Ij xj < 4.
Proof. We build up the set S greedily as follows. On each iteration, starting from the earliest
item t which is not fully covered, we add the job whose interval contains t and ends the latest.
More formally, let S0 = ∅. For any set S, let (x, S)|t :=
∑
j∈S:Ij3t xj . On iteration i, find
ti = min{t : (x, Si−1)|t < min(1, Bt)}. Find ji = arg max{t ∈ Ij : j 6∈ Si−1, ti ∈ Ij}, and set
Si = Si−1 ∪ {ji}. Let S = Si∗ , where i∗ is the last iteration.
By construction, min{1, Bt} ≤
∑
j∈S:t∈Ij xj for all t. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
there exists t′ such that
∑
j∈S:t′∈Ij xj ≥ 4. Let {j1, j2, · · · } ⊆ S be all jobs in S containing t′,
indexed in the order in which they were added to S. Let a be such that 1 ≤∑ai=1 xji < 2, and let
U< = {j1, · · · , ja}. Similarly, sort the jobs such that they are indexed in order by decreasing end
time; let b be such that 1 ≤∑bi=1 xji < 2, and let U> = {j1, · · · , jb}. Note that ∑j∈U<∪U> xj < 4,
so there exists a job j′ which is not in either U< or U>. This job was added to S after all jobs in
U< were added, and it ends before all jobs in U>. Let i
′ be the iteration on which j′ was added to
S; we will show there is no item ti′ for which the algorithm would have added j
′.
Observe that, because the algorithm covers items starting with the earliest uncovered item first,
at every iteration i the set of covered items (i.e., the set {t : (x, Si−1)|t ≥ min(1, Bt)}) is a prefix
of T , the set of all items. Therefore, by the time the algorithm has added U< to S, all items up to
and including t′ have been covered. So ti′ cannot come before or be equal to t′. But all jobs in U>
contain item t′, and therefore must have been added to S before job j′ because they end later. So
item ti′ cannot come after t
′. Therefore job j′ cannot have been added to S.
7.6 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2. Given a set U of jobs and a non-zero fractional allocation y, there exist sets of arms
J 6= ∅ and D such that
i. J ∩D = ∅;
ii. J ∩D′ = ∅, where D′ = {ja : ja′ ∈ D, a 6= a′};
iii. for all t ∈ EJ , wt(y, J ∪D) ≥ min{1,wt(y)};
iv. for all t ∈ EJ , wt(y, J) ≤ 7; and
v. FracWt(yJ) ≥ 2FracWt(yD).
Furthermore, J and D can be found efficiently.
Proof. If wt(y) ≤ 6 for all t ∈ T , then set J = U and D = ∅. This satisfies the conditions. So
assume that there exists t such that wt(y) > 6. Pick such a t with maximal depth d(t). Thus, for
all t′ in the subtree below t, wt′(y) ≤ 6.
Suppose there is a set of arms S which begin at or above t and terminate at t such that
wt(y, S) > 3. Define the depth of an arm to be the depth of the highest edge in its desired
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Figure 4: An example for one step of layering algorithm. (Left figure:) At the beginning of the layering
step, there are 101 jobs: (s− t−e1), (t−e2), (t−e3), · · · , (t−e100), (u). Each job has value 1 and allocation
0.9. The capacity of edge t is 90, while the capacity of other edges are 1. (Middle figure:) In the first step
of the layering process, job (s− t− e1) is in set D, jobs (t− e2), (t− e3), (t− e3) and (u) are in set J . The
job in set D is deleted, while the jobs in set J have their weight scaled down and allocated to one layer.
(Right figure:) The capacity of edges after the first step of layering procedure. The capacity of edges that
have positive weight in set J are decreased by 1.
interval, so that arms with low depth desire intervals beginning higher in the tree. Then let
j1
a, j2
a, · · · , jka, · · · , j`a be a subset of S sorted in decreasing order by depth such that
`−1∑
i=1
yjia < 3 ≤
∑`
i=1
yjia
and ∑`
i=k+1
yjia < 1 ≤
∑`
i=k
yjia .
Then let J = {j1a, · · · , jka} and D = {jk+1a, · · · , j`a}. Because we are considering arms which
terminate at t, Ijia ⊆ Iji+1a for all i ∈ [` − 1]. In particular, we(y, J ∪D) ≥
∑`
i=k yjia ≥ 1 for all
e ∈ TJ . Observe that FracWt(yJ) ≥ 2FracWt(yD). This satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
Suppose there is no set S of arms terminating at t such that wt(y, S) > 3. Then there must
exist a set of arms including t but terminating below t with total weight at least 3. Let t1, · · · , td
be the d edges below t. Let Si be the set of arms that contain both t and ti, and Ti be the set of
arms containing only edges within the subtree planted at ti. Because wti(y, Si) ≤ 6 for all i by our
choice of t, we can find m such that 3 ≤ ∑mi=1wt(y, Si) < 9. Let S = ⋃mi=1 Si. Let c = wt(y, S),
so 3 ≤ c < 9. Let j1a, · · · , jka, · · · , j`a be the arms in S sorted in decreasing order by depth, as
before, where
2
∑`
i=k+1
yjia ≤
k∑
i=1
yjia ≤ 7
and ∑`
i=k
yjia ≥ 1.
Then set J = {jia : i = 1, · · · , k} ∪ T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm and D = {jia : i = k + 1, · · · , `}. For
each edge e ∈ TJ , wt(y, J) ≤ 7. The same as in previous case for each edge e that is not below t,
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we(y, J∪D) ≥
∑`
i=k yjia ≥ 1; for each edge e below t in TJ , we(y, J∪D) = wt(y). FracWt(yJ) ≥∑k
i=1 yjia ≥ 2
∑`
i=k+1 yjia = FracWt(yD). Thus every condition of the lemma is satisfied.
7.7 Proof of Lemma 6.1
Lemma 6.1. FracOpt~c ≥ Opt~c.
Proof. Let x∗j be the probability that job j is allocated in optimal offline allocation, where the
randomness is over all possible realizations of the values. Then x∗ is a fractional allocation of jobs.
Let dtr be the probability that the rth copy of item t is allocated in offline optimal allocation. Then
0 ≤ dtr ≤ 1, bt(x∗) =
∑
r dtr,
Opt~c =
∑
j
vjx
∗
j −
∑
t,r
dtrctr.
To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that FracVal(x∗,~c) ≥ Opt~c, which is equivalent to proving∑
t,r btrctr ≤
∑
t,r dtrctr. This is true since for every t and k,
∑
r≥k dtr ≥
∑
r≥k btr, and∑
r≥1
dtrctr = ct1
∑
r≥1
dtr + (ct2 − ct1)
∑
r≥2
dtr + (ct3 − ct2)
∑
r≥3
dtr + · · ·
≥ ct1
∑
r≥1
btr + (ct2 − ct1)
∑
r≥2
btr + (ct3 − ct2)
∑
r≥3
btr + · · · =
∑
r≥1
btrctr.
7.8 Proof of Lemma 6.2
Lemma 6.2. For any cost vector ~c and a fractional unit allocation with costs, (x, τ), there exists
an anonymous bundle pricing p such that
SW(p) ≥ 1
2
FracVal(x, τ,~c).
Proof. We will give a reduction to the fixed-capacity setting without costs and apply Lemma 3.1.
Recall that in a fractional unit allocation with costs, each job j with xj > 0 is explicitly associated
with a particular bundle, and each bundle is explicitly associated with a particular copy of each
item contained in the bundle. Thus, the allocation defines a unique charging of the total cost to
individual jobs. We construct a pricing instance in the fixed-capacity setting by subtracting from
each job’s value the cost of serving it. That is, for every job j in the instance with costs, we
construct a job j′ in the instance without costs with value
vj′ = vj −
∑
t∈I,(t,r)∈τk
ctr,
where k is such that j ∈ Ak (i.e., the fractional unit allocation with costs assigns job j to bundle
k). Thus the two instances have identical fractional values, i.e. FracVal′(x) = FracVal(x, τ,~c).
By Lemma 3.1, there exists a static, anonymous bundle pricing p′ such that
SW′(p′) ≥ 1
2
FracVal′(x),
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and each set τk is assigned a price p
′
k. We use this bundle pricing to associate the following prices
p to the original instance with costs. For each bundle τk, for each interval I ⊆ Tk, set price
pτk,I = p
′
k +
∑
t∈I,(t,r)∈τk
ctr.
We refer to the price p′k as the base price for bundle τk, and the sum over costs as the surcharge
for interval I.
Our menu lists a price for every subinterval of every bundle, covering every copy of every item.18
However, the mechanism sells at most one interval per bundle: when a buyer selects her preferred
interval, the mechanism removes all intervals corresponding to the same bundle from the menu.
Thus, our menu is adaptive (prices of unsold intervals change in response to demand for other
intervals), though it remains anonymous.
We now claim that the social welfare generated by pricing p in the instance with costs is
precisely equal to the social welfare generated by pricing p′ for the new fixed-capacity instance.
We prove this pointwise by coupling the buyers’ values and arrival order in the two settings, and
then by induction over the number of buyers that have already arrived. Our inductive hypothesis
is that at any point of time, the set of bundles available in the new instance is exactly the same
as the set of unsold bundles in the original instance. By the way we construct buyers’ values in
the new instance, buyers’ preferences over bundles in the two instances are exactly coupled. Thus,
the buyers’ total utility is the same in each instance. Furthermore, the revenue generated by the
base price of each bundle is equal to the revenue generated in the fixed-capacity instance, and the
surcharge covers the production costs.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
7.9 Proof of Lemma 6.3
Lemma 6.3. For all non-decreasing costs ~c and every fractional allocation x, there exists a frac-
tional unit allocation (x′, τ) such that
FracVal(x,~c) ≤ O(logL/ log logL)FracVal(x′, τ,~c).
Proof. We partition the multiset of items as well as the fractional allocation x into layers using the
procedure described in the proof of Theorem 3.11 in Section 3.3. Let Yr denote the rth layer and
x(r) denote the unscaled fractional allocation associated with layer r, so that
∑
r x
(r) = x. Let S(r)
denote the set of jobs associated with x(r), so that x(r) = xS(r) . Observe that by the manner in
which we create layers, the sets S(r) partition the set of all jobs.
Let b′tr =
∑
j∈S(r):Ij3t xj =
∑
j:Ij3t x
(r)
j be the total fractional weight of jobs containing item t in
level r. Let rˆt be the maximum layer index r such that b
′
tr > 0. By the nature of the layering process,
every layer below rˆt is “filled”: 1 ≤ b′tr < 4 for every r < rˆt. Then
∑
r≥1 b
′
tr =
∑
r≥1 btr = bt, and∑
r≥k b
′
tr ≤
∑
r≥k btr for every k > 1, where the latter inequality follows by recalling that btr ≤ 1
and b′tr ≥ 1 for all r. If we associate cost ctr with item t in all jobs assigned to layer r, then the
18In practice, of course, for each interval the menu can list just the minimum price over all unsold bundles.
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total cost of item t is∑
r≥1
b′trctr = ct1
∑
r≥1
b′tr + (ct2 − ct1)
∑
r≥2
b′tr + (ct3 − ct2)
∑
r≥3
b′tr + · · ·
≤ ct1
∑
r≥1
btr + (ct2 − ct1)
∑
r≥2
btr + (ct3 − ct2)
∑
r≥3
btr + · · · =
∑
r≥1
btrctr,
with the last term being exactly the cost of item t in fractional allocation x.
Now consider the fractional allocation x˜(r) for each layer Yr, defined as x˜
(r) = x(r)/4. This is
a supply feasible allocation of items in layer Yr. Furthermore, summing over all layers, the sum
of jobs’ valuations under this suite of allocations is exactly a quarter of that under x, whereas the
cost is exactly a quarter of the cost
∑
r≥1 b
′
trctr defined above for the unscaled allocations x
(r). We
therefore conclude that
∑
r
FracVal(x˜(r)) =
1
4
∑
r
 ∑
j∈S(r)
vjxj − b′trctr
 ≥ 1
4
FracVal(x).
We will now convert each x˜(r) into a unit allocation corresponding to layer Yr by reducing it to
an appropriate unit-capacity setting without costs. Observe that we can write
∑
r
FracVal(x˜(r)) =
1
4
∑
r
 ∑
j∈S(r)
vjxj − b′trctr
 = 1
4
∑
j∈S(r)
(
vj −
∑
t∈Ij
ctr
)
xj .
Define a unit-capacity setting over the set of items Yr, where the value of a job j is given
by v′j = vj −
∑
t∈Ij ctr. The allocation x˜
(r) is demand-feasible for this setting. We can there-
fore apply Theorem 3.10 to obtain a unit allocation x′(r) for this setting with the property that
FracVal(x˜(r)) ≤ O(logL/ log logL)FracVal(x′(r)). Let {T1r, T2r, · · · } denote the partition of
items in Yr corresponding to this unit allocation. Set τkr = {(t, r) : t ∈ Tkr}. Then the pair
(
∑
r x
′(r), {τk,r}) forms a unit allocation for our original setting that obtains the claimed welfare
bound.
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